A man has been “haunting” the Russian security services FSB and GRU since last week, following Ukraine’s incredibly inventive drone operation targeting five military bases deep inside Russia, damaging long-range aircraft of Putin’s Air Force. Artem Timofeev, a 37-year-old DJ, is reportedly — according to available information — an SBU (Ukrainian Security Service) agent who led the “Spider’s Web” operation, launched on Sunday, June 1.

Together with his wife, Katya Timofeeva, who also participated in the operation, they “vanished” from their neighborhood in Chelyabinsk, where they had rented an apartment in a residential building for at least the past five years. They appeared to be an ordinary couple, but for the past year and a half, Timofeev had been preparing an impressive operation that severely damaged Putin’s image by destroying dozens of long-range bombers and radar aircraft.

Some Russian media now describe the young man as a “wolf in sheep’s clothing,” someone who lived an ordinary life up until June 1 — working, socializing with his wife and friends, and keeping a low profile. It took about 48 hours for FSB agents to identify the man who executed Ukraine’s most daring attack deep inside Russian territory.

“The Ghost of Zhytomyr”

Very little has leaked about Artem Timofeev since his name and photo were made public through leaks from Russian security services to pro-Kremlin media. This indicates that the 37-year-old SBU agent had been extremely careful since relocating to Russia, activating every security precaution in order to act at the right moment, after first building the perfect cover.

Sparse information describes him as a young entrepreneur born in Zhytomyr, Ukraine (some claim Irkutsk), who later moved to Russia with many family members from Kyiv. It is believed he was recruited by the SBU between 2010 and 2012, during a time when he was heavily involved in music as a DJ and had even launched a clothing line.

Western intelligence officials refer to him as “The Ghost of Zhytomyr” because his identity and activities were known only to a very small circle within the SBU. Even after the attack, few traces of him were found.

How he met his wife Katya remains unknown, as does whether she was already an SBU agent or was recruited later by Artem. When the couple moved to Chelyabinsk, Russian authorities paid no attention to a Ukrainian couple settling in with relatives in search of a better life. But after the dramatic strike last Sunday, authorities are using every tool available to track down the 37-year-old spy who, with four trucks and 117 drones, dealt a serious blow to the Russian military “bear.”

Routes Through Kazakhstan

Looking at photos of Artem Timofeev — casually dressed, wearing a beanie — it’s hard to imagine that over the past six months he had set up a trucking company. He founded it in October 2024, seven months before the “Spider’s Web” operation was executed in all its glory, after thorough preparation that, according to Ukrainian sources, took a year and a half.

Timofeev received the drones through a company that ran routes into Russia via Kazakhstan, which was fully secure and sealed off. There were 117 drones in total, each operated by a skilled pilot — some of whom entered Russia through different border zones.

As is common in such operations, the drone operators were informed of their specific targets only one or two days before the strike. Western intelligence circles suspect a strong Mossad influence, claiming that the Ukrainians would likely not have conceived such a high-level attack on their own.

It is almost certain that the Israelis — experts in these types of covert missions — assisted at least with the concept of such a bold strike deep inside Russia. The operation, even if flawlessly executed by Timofeev and his team (including his wife), seems too sophisticated to have originated solely from the SBU.

Zero Hour

Katya Timofeeva didn’t have a strong literary output, reportedly writing just two low-grade romantic novels under the pseudonym Katerina Gato. The first was titled “I Was Happy Because You Hated Me”, and the second “I Turned Evil Because You Loved Me” — hardly imaginative titles.

The pro-Kremlin website Readovka noted that the second title turned out to be prophetic, writing: “Katya escaped with her beloved. Artem is now wanted for his connection to the terrorist attack in the Irkutsk region (home to the Belaya airbase). Four trucks were registered in his name, one of which carried the drones used in the attack.”

Two weeks before the strike, Katya went offline, deleting all her social media and wiping digital traces. Their Chelyabinsk apartment was thoroughly searched by FSB teams for clues. Relatives were interrogated, reportedly stunned by the revelations of the couple’s secret lives.

Just hours after the surprise strike deep inside Russia, the SBU announced that all operatives involved had safely exited Russian territory and avoided any lurking danger.

Strike at the Heart

On Sunday, June 1, Russian personnel at five military bases deep inland experienced the shock of an unprecedented Ukrainian drone strike — massive in scale, and prepared over a year and a half. According to released information, 117 drones targeted airbases housing long-range bombers capable of carrying nuclear weapons.

The drones were remotely operated by 117 individuals — possibly via satellite, though internet control wasn’t ruled out. The full scale of Operation “Spider’s Web” became clear as explosions were reported across multiple time zones in Russia: from Murmansk above the Arctic Circle to the Amur region in the far east — 8,000 km from Ukraine.

Russia’s Ministry of Defense confirmed attacks in five regions (Murmansk, Irkutsk, Ivanovo, Ryazan, and Amur) but claimed damage was only done in Murmansk and Irkutsk, asserting that other attacks were repelled.

Shortly after, photos emerged showing SBU chief Vasyl Maliuk examining a satellite map of airfields, clearly marked with the Russian bases. He stated that the drones had been smuggled into Russia, placed in wooden cabins in the back of trucks, and hidden under detachable remote-controlled roofs. The trucks were then driven near airbases — often by drivers unaware of the cargo, as later investigations confirmed.

The drones were launched and, according to Ukrainian sources, struck 41 long-range aircraft, including Tu-95, Tu-22M3, Tu-160 bombers, and A-50 radar planes. Russia, in contrast, admitted to only limited damage without giving exact figures — for obvious reasons.

The Russian Response

For decades, when Russia suffers serious image damage, its authorities tend to conceal the full truth or downplay the incident — especially when it occurs within its borders.

Thus, they haven’t disclosed how many aircraft were hit. However, Western intelligence analysts confirmed at least 13 aircraft were destroyed or damaged. The intelligence-focused site The Insider noted that the Ukrainian drone attack exposed significant security flaws in Russia’s military infrastructure.

That the trucks were driven by unwitting operators — as confirmed during interrogations — highlights the extraordinary level of planning and compartmentalization. FSB and GRU were completely unprepared for such a serious internal attack and were severely discredited — similar to how the CIA failed to anticipate the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan with 130,000 troops.

The astonishing ease with which Artem Timofeev and his team infiltrated Russia for such a complex operation raises serious questions about the effectiveness and vigilance of both FSB and GRU.