With the so-called “calm waters” increasingly under strain—and with the risk that a prolonged absence of high-level meetings could symbolically widen the gap between the two sides, with tangible consequences on the ground—Athens and Ankara are moving quickly to finalize the details for convening the Supreme Cooperation Council between Greece and Türkiye (SCC) before the start of Ramadan on February 18.

With expectations deliberately kept low, both sides are seeking to preserve a fragile momentum: avoiding major crises and maintaining open channels to manage incidents as they arise. This approach reflects a shared awareness that an uncontrolled deterioration in relations, or a new crisis in the Aegean or the Eastern Mediterranean, would be difficult to contain in the current international environment shaped by the emerging Trump doctrine.

The SCC was originally scheduled to meet in late 2024, then postponed to early 2025, but developments on the ground ultimately prevented it from convening. Issues such as maritime spatial planning, marine protected areas, the conditions attached to Türkiye’s participation in the SAFE program, trilateral cooperation with Israel, and Greece’s strengthening of its defense capabilities have created a context in which Ankara remains deeply uncomfortable.

Cyprus–Crete interconnection

Tensions have been further compounded by Türkiye’s attempt to block exploration related to the electricity interconnection between Cyprus and Crete—a project that remains frozen—as well as by Ankara’s renewed articulation of its long-standing claims. These range from references to “grey zones” and demands for the demilitarization of the Greek islands, to a selective and arbitrary interpretation of international law regarding the delimitation of the median line between the continental coasts of the two countries, entirely disregarding the existence and rights of the Greek islands.

While none of this represents a substantive change, Athens believes the meeting should take place regardless of the difficulties involved. The aim is to keep communication channels open and to signal the political will of both governments to maintain relations at a level of basic normalcy, fully aware that their positions on core issues—most notably the delimitation of the continental shelf and Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs) in the Aegean—remain fundamentally opposed.

This is far from an easy task. Almost daily, points of friction emerge on the ground, directly linked to the exercise of Greek sovereign rights. At the same time, the ongoing exchange of public statements always carries the risk of escalation—whether over Gaza and Israel, the SAFE program, or Thrace—none of which would serve the stated goal of maintaining “calm waters.”

Last week, Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan reiterated that the two sides should simply “sit in a room until they find a solution to the Aegean problem,” dismissing exploratory talks as pointless. However, he did not explain why, after the repeated efforts he and Greek Foreign Minister George Gerapetritis undertook—and after abandoning the exploratory process—they were unable to identify even a minimal common basis for discussion. His reference to “resolving the issue of territorial waters” may explain, as Athens has categorically ruled out any negotiation on territorial waters, which it considers an inherent exercise of sovereign rights.

Greece has made clear that no discussion can begin without prior agreement on its scope. Athens rejects Ankara’s demand that talks encompass the full range of Turkish claims and challenges to Greek sovereignty. A further prerequisite is the acceptance of international law and the Law of the Sea, as well as the possibility of referring the dispute to the International Court of Justice in The Hague if no agreement is reached.

Different priorities

The Greek Foreign Ministry assesses that, at this stage, Türkiye has other strategic priorities and shows limited interest in engaging in substantive negotiations over maritime delimitation in the Aegean.

Nevertheless, officials on Vassilissis Sofias Street believe Greece currently holds sufficient diplomatic and geopolitical leverage to enter such difficult talks—without harboring illusions about an immediate positive response from Ankara. Turkey is grappling with major regional crises along its southern, eastern, and northern borders, the outcomes of which will shape both its regional standing and its negotiating position vis-à-vis Donald Trump.

At the same time, the Erdoğan government—facing declining approval ratings—has little incentive to pursue a conciliatory process with Greece, which would expose it to fierce criticism from both the Kemalist opposition and its nationalist ally, Devlet Bahçeli.

A climate of hostility

Much of the escalation in tone originates in the Turkish media, which has long cultivated a confrontational atmosphere, often accusing the government of excessive restraint. A characteristic example is a recent article by Özay Şendir, director of Milliyet and a member of the Greek-Turkish Forum. After presenting an alarmist account of Greece and Cyprus’s relations with Israel and Cyprus’s efforts to bolster its defenses with Israeli weapons, he resorted to stark rhetoric:

“If there is a provocation or an attempt to initiate a controlled conflict and the political will in Ankara gives the order, action can be taken immediately… Developments in 2026 require the Turkish Armed Forces to be ready at any moment for a new Operation Attila.”

Fidan, for his part, has returned to the familiar argument that domestic political balances in Greece are obstructing progress in talks—an explanation that obscures the real source of the impasse: Ankara’s challenge not only to Greek sovereign rights, but increasingly to Greek sovereignty itself. At the same time, he seeks to sidestep even the conditions for preliminary talks grounded in international law and mutual respect for sovereignty, as he must constantly demonstrate his “patriotic credentials” to domestic audiences.

Fidan’s room for maneuver is further constrained by internal power dynamics. Seen by many as a leading contender in the post-Erdoğan succession race—possibly rivaling Erdoğan’s son, Bilal—he is under constant pressure to project political legitimacy. This leaves little space for a flexible approach to the Aegean, compelling him instead to advance rigid, dogmatic positions that contradict international law and cannot realistically serve as a starting point for serious negotiations.