In the high-profile espionage case that has gripped Greece for the past ten days, the 54-year-old accused wing commander reportedly admitted during questioning by the military judge-investigator that he was recruited by a Chinese agent named “Steven Wayne,” who introduced himself as a representative of a technology company in response to the commander’s LinkedIn profile. Initially, their “collaboration” involved harmless studies for a façade website, but later the Chinese, through threats and blackmail, demanded—without payment—that he provide classified information on digital and electronic telecommunications applications and platforms.

During a trip to Beijing, he also met the agent “William,” Steven’s senior. Last Thursday, photos surfaced of the wing commander with Steven and William, smiling and laughing at the Great Wall of China.

Regardless of the truth of the 54-year-old officer’s confessed wrongdoing, the leaks to the media—apart from perhaps the photographic snapshots—align with known methods of recruiting and managing spies by the Chinese intelligence service: the infamous MSS (Ministry of State Security of China), which, alongside the army, forms a core pillar for ensuring the country’s internal and external security while protecting the ruling Communist Party (CCP) from espionage threats. MSS agents frequently search social media and professional networking profiles, like LinkedIn, to identify and connect with individuals in strategic positions in foreign military, governmental, or corporate structures—primarily in the U.S., NATO, and Taiwan—with the ultimate aim of recruitment.

The same applies to so-called job offers, where recruiter agents approach targets under the pretense of interest in their expertise and offer supposedly well-paid consulting work or research opportunities, assessing their willingness to provide confidential information for money. Front companies are also used to approach and recruit specialists in critical sectors like communications, cybersecurity, nuclear technology, and aerospace. Many of these methods match those reportedly used to recruit the wing commander.

Its “Identity”

The MSS is a massive political-security apparatus that continually surprises Western observers with the scope, complexity, and effectiveness of its operations. It bears no resemblance to any other major Western intelligence agency—in fact, it surpasses them. MSS combines the duties, responsibilities, and domains of the CIA, FBI, and MI6 into a single, highly empowered structure, operating both domestically and abroad, with unlimited authority and a network of 800,000 agents employing the latest technology, advanced data interception methods, and intelligence control techniques.

Comparative figures are striking. The UK’s MI5 and MI6 have a combined staff of about 9,000, roughly 1/90th the size of MSS. The CIA is estimated to have around 21,500 agents, a ratio of 1/37. FBI Director Christopher Wray recently estimated that MSS-developed hackers outnumber his agency’s cyber staff by 50 to 1.

MSS’s main functions include internal security—which involves close surveillance of Chinese citizens at home and abroad to suppress dissent and control information—and external espionage to acquire critical military, technological, and political intelligence, as well as cyber-espionage and digital propaganda operations.

In today’s “world of spies,” digital surveillance, cyberattacks, and mass data collection dominate, with information itself being the most valuable weapon. In the global power competition, which goes beyond military strategy to control networks, technology, and data flow, MSS has become one of the most aggressive actors.

With the rise of artificial intelligence, its mission now includes manipulating reality itself. MSS is active in producing deepfakes, fake digital identities, and “bot armies” capable of creating political confusion, undermining institutions, and provoking unrest of unknown origin. Simultaneously, it aggressively pursues technological theft, patents, and research data, as industrial espionage has become a critical tool of geopolitical influence.

The Four Targets

Jim Lewis, an American diplomat with 30 years of experience on China, told CBS that MSS’s focus has four levels. First is the “internal enemy,” as controlling dissent is the regime’s top priority. This includes ethnic minorities like Uyghurs and Tibetans.

Second is Taiwan, reportedly consuming up to 50% of MSS agent activity. Third is the U.S., representing a separate, vast chapter of MSS operations. Fourth are other countries, particularly NATO members, with objectives including large-scale espionage, influence operations, and intelligence collection by all means.

Unlike other major intelligence services, MSS operates in a decentralized manner. While headquartered in Beijing, U.S. operations are led by the Shanghai State Security Bureau (SSSB), and Zhejiang State Security Bureau (ZSSB) oversees European operations. Regional offices have significant autonomy in pursuing domestic and international sources with targeted focus.

An example of its effectiveness: in 2017, SSSB recruited U.S. Defense contractor and former CIA officer Kevin Mallory, who provided classified information for $25,000 before being arrested by the FBI and sentenced to 20 years.

CSIS Research

Research by the CSIS (Center for Strategic and International Studies) documented 224 MSS operations from 2000 to March 2023 in the U.S., including theft of advanced security system data, information on cutting-edge weapons (F-16, F-22, Stealth), NASA projects including the Discovery mission, malware infiltration into government ministries and Silicon Valley companies, recruitment of agents, and arrests of American intelligence personnel.

The research emphasized the illegal acquisition of information by Chinese intelligence officers or agents and the rise of Chinese covert influence operations. It concluded that Chinese espionage is conducted to achieve broader strategic goals, marking a shift from the past when commercial incentives were equally important.

This change occurred after Xi Jinping rose to power in March 2013. 69% of incidents happened post this milestone. The study noted 104 cyber-espionage incidents in the last decade alone. China also employs traditional recruitment methods (usually sex or money) and unconventional approaches, such as purchasing property near military or research facilities.

Among cases with identified perpetrators, 49% involved Chinese military or government employees, 41% private Chinese citizens, and 10% non-Chinese, usually Americans recruited by Chinese officials. 46% involved cyber-espionage, 29% targeted military technology, and 54% commercial technologies.

In Europe, Chinese espionage is also extensive. According to the Financial Times, in 2019 the EU’s foreign affairs service warned that about 250 Chinese spies were in Brussels. MSS agent Daniel Wu reportedly pushed Belgian ex-senator Frank Creyelman to influence EU discussions in favor of Chinese interests, including domestic repression in China and persecution of Uyghurs in Xinjiang. Wu was also a contact for other far-right pro-Russia politicians.

Origins and Leadership

MSS was founded in June 1983 by merging two government agencies: the Central Investigation Department (CID) and the Counter-Espionage Department of the Ministry of Public Security (MPS). After the 1989 Tiananmen Square uprising, MSS adopted a more aggressive approach toward political dissent, closely monitoring intellectuals and student groups while expanding domestic counterintelligence capabilities.

In the 1990s, MSS focused on technology to help China develop by stealing innovations from foreign companies and governments via cyberespionage and human infiltration. In the 2000s and 2010s, these practices intensified, increasingly focusing on cyberattacks. In the current decade, MSS expanded into political interference, offensive cyberattacks (including sabotage), spy recruitment, and placing influence agents in Western nations.

Chen Yixin

A turning point for MSS was Xi Jinping’s rise in 2013. The Chinese leader quickly established a new Espionage Law in 2014, updated in 2023 by the new Minister of State Security, Chen Yixin. The provisions broadened the definition and scope of espionage and potential targets.

Chen, 66, is considered a pillar of the regime and a close Xi ally. On December 11, 2025, in a party publication article, he outlined the hardline 2026–2030 national security plan, aiming to build a new “Great Wall” of national security, focusing on Taiwan, technological security, anti-espionage operations, and foreign intelligence activities.

Chen is also leading a long-term public communication campaign, training Chinese citizens to view national security and individual contributions as a top priority. A three-minute video released for “National Security Education Day” sent a clear message: foreign spies are everywhere, constantly changing identities, but together, China’s 1.4 billion people form 1.4 billion lines of defense.