The safeguards secured through the SAFE mechanism for the allocation of €150 billion in European loans will be tested in practice. The focus is to ensure that this mechanism is not ultimately used for unrestricted support of Turkey’s defense industry, nor to foster a special relationship Ankara seeks with the EU centered on European Defense.

The safeguards provided, both via the SAFE Regulation presentation and in the bodies of COREPER and the General Affairs Council that approved it, are subject to multiple interpretations and are exposed to political dynamics and diplomatic balances.

Diplomatic sources in Athens responded yesterday to criticism from opposition parties, emphasizing that consensus and the consideration of national security interests are assured.

Specifically, these sources stated:

• The Regulation is a specific financial program with a limited (four-year) duration. It was adopted by a qualified majority (thus no veto is foreseen), with 26 states voting in favor, including Greece and Cyprus.
• During negotiations, Greece secured strong legal bases regarding the participation conditions for candidate countries.
• The Regulation sets out the general framework. Subsequent bilateral agreements between the EU and third countries will follow, provided the conditions are met. After Greek intervention, these agreements will require unanimity, based on Article 212 of the TFEU.

Diplomatic sources tried to reassure concerns that some safeguards received by Greece might be bypassed, noting that from the outset, the plan did not include any possibility of blocking—neither by Greece nor by Cyprus.

In the EU, a positive climate has developed for cooperation with Turkey in defense, with the prevailing view that such collaboration could bring Ankara closer to Europe—even as Turkey pursues an independent foreign policy, often moving in opposite directions from the EU’s principles and objectives.

Turkey’s defense industry cooperation with Italian and Spanish companies, along with NATO’s efforts for closer collaboration with the EU from member states that are not EU members, provide significant diplomatic momentum for Ankara.

The enforcement of the safeguards Greece has obtained will be continuously tested, as they are open to different interpretations that may be influenced by partner pressure to remove obstacles to military cooperation with Turkey.

The legal basis under Article 212 of the TFEU for agreements with third countries involves participation in 65% of the project or procurement value. However, this is not explicitly referenced in the Regulation but in a statement by the European Commission attached to the minutes of COREPER and the General Affairs Council. This weakens its binding nature, as in cases of deadlock or lack of unanimity, the Commission is not institutionally obliged to adhere to a different legal basis that allows third-country participation via qualified majority voting.

Additionally, Article 16 of the Regulation states:

“Guarantees provide assurances that the participation of the contractor or subcontractor in joint procurement does not conflict with the security and defense interests of the Union and Member States, as defined within the framework of the Common Foreign and Security Policy.”

This applies to companies vying for projects worth 35%, for which no formal obligation beyond this reference exists.

For third-country companies that might participate in joint projects with European firms or through vehicles acquired by European companies, it will be extremely difficult to prove and accept as sufficient the argument that such involvement conflicts with EU and member states’ security and defense interests. Decisions will be made by qualified majority.

In this battle, Greece, with the approval of the Regulation for the SAFE mechanism of €150 billion, has tools to press for parameters and conditions on Turkey’s participation in European arms exports. However, this will require constant vigilance and substantial diplomatic capital.

This effort will also inevitably impact Greece’s relations with Ankara, as Turkey perceives any Greek move to deepen ties with the EU—especially when Greece highlights the paradox of Turkey still maintaining a casus belli, disputing the sovereignty of a member state, and occupying territory of another EU member—as hostile and malicious, incompatible with the Greek-Turkish rapprochement.

In this ongoing contest, Greece will also have to contend with shortsighted policies from some allies, who, once again, in relation to Turkey, persist in ostrich-like denial—ignoring that potential short-term gains from Turkey’s unconditional entry into European Defense ultimately undermine the very foundation of the EU’s Common Defense and Strategic Autonomy in an increasingly volatile global landscape.