“More than 1,200, with an average age of 16 years,” is the estimate by shipping analytics firm Ardmore for the tankers in Russia’s smuggling fleet, through which sanctions related to the invasion of Ukraine are being circumvented. Another specialist — consultancy Windward — gives an even higher figure, estimating some 1,400 vessels are doing “Putin’s work.” If those estimates hold, roughly 17% of the world’s tanker fleet is involved in smuggling for Russia.

When EU sanctions were tightened, Moscow moved to create a parallel, “shadow” maritime system alongside the legitimate one. In 2022 there was an explosion in sales of old and very old oil tankers that in other circumstances would have been sent for scrap. Demand was such that, in many cases, tankers that had already been sent to breakers were sold again.

“Golden business”

That year, prices for second-hand oil tankers — especially Aframaxes (which can carry up to ~600,000 barrels, the typical load used for Ural crude from Baltic ports) — soared. VesselsValue recorded a 86% price increase for 20‑year‑old Aframaxes (from $11.8m to $22m) and logged 148 Aframax sales, a 5% rise from the same period in 2021.

Because these are very old ships often headed for scrap, another problem arises: many are ghost ships lacking proper documentation, as shown by the French navy’s capture of the tanker Boracay. Intriguingly, that vessel is also suspected of having been used as a launch point for drones that flew over Denmark in recent days.

Changing flags while underway

The Russian “shadow” fleet reportedly uses a wide range of deceptive tactics to avoid sanctions: ship‑to‑ship (STS) transfers, AIS darkening (switching off automatic identification), spoofing (falsifying positions and transmitting false data), renaming or altering identity markers (IMO numbers).

These tankers typically fly flags of convenience — Liberia, Gabon, the Cook Islands, Eswatini, the Marshall Islands, Panama, Malta — or sometimes even Russia. Some vessels are being absorbed into the state shipping company SCF or into rapidly emerging players in the Russian (and wider) shipping business. Often ships even change flags while underway to make tracking by European authorities harder.

These vessels are usually in poor condition with zero maintenance and poorly trained, often temporary crews. European maritime sources estimate that some damage to Baltic cables previously attributed to sabotage may instead have resulted from negligent handling and minor accidents by such tankers carrying illicit Russian oil.

Where the oil ends up

A European Parliament report estimates that crude carried by shadow tankers is being rerouted to an expanding set of destinations, with Turkey, China and Brazil among the main buyers. The Kyiv School of Economics (KSE) calculated that last April the Russian shadow fleet moved about 92.4 million barrels, roughly 82% of the exports via the Baltic Sea. The Center for the Study of Democracy estimates that, because of this practice, up to 25% of refined oil imported into Europe may still originate from Russia.

S&P Global estimates there are about 591 tankers in the fleet carrying Russian oil, while the Center for Research on Energy and Clean Air (CREA) reports that three shadow tankers depart Russian ports daily. These figures are cautious because many of these vessels serve multiple clients and may carry sanctioned and non‑sanctioned cargoes, complicating monitoring and enforcement.

Transfers at sea

In December 2023, in the Laconian Gulf, 12 old tankers were anchored, waiting their turn to take part in contraband operations a little over six nautical miles from the coast — international waters where Greek authorities cannot intervene. Those tankers were among those performing STS transfers to launder oil.

This activity is not unprecedented: the Laconian Gulf has long been used as a sheltered spot for transshipment between VLCCs (Very Large Crude Carriers) and smaller tankers when passage through the Bosporus is impractical. In the cases described, oil originating from ports such as Ust‑Luga and Novorossiysk — even transported by state SCF vessels — is transferred to others to create so‑called “Turkish blend” (mixing Russian crude with residues from cargoes unloaded in Turkey to legitimize it). Another method is loading ghost ships that then carry the crude to India for refining, giving it a new declared origin.