The testimonies of employees and technicians regarding the deadly explosion at Violanta are revealing. Among other things, a factory worker who was acting as a plumber without holding a license testified that together with the company’s owner, Kostas Tziortziotis, they were trying to identify the cause of the strong odor without achieving anything.

Employees’ statements say the same thing in different words: the smell of LPG was noticeable—often intense—for a long time. So much so that some female workers were forced to cover their noses and mouths in order to breathe.

Moreover—and this is a point of critical importance—employee training on safety protocols and on what actions should automatically be taken in the event of an accident or danger had been completely neglected. No one had been trained, and no one at Violanta had ensured colleagues were trained, at the very least to be able to save themselves if something went wrong.

The testimonies were given in early February to a team of senior Fire Service officers. What is described leaves little room for doubt as to whether Violanta’s problems—primarily the propane leak and the lack of provisions for rescue in unforeseen dangers or accidents—were known to management.

“The owner gave me the plans to install a new gas line even though I don’t have a license”

Worker H.P., who acted as a plumber without holding the required license, testified that he had noticed an odor “like LPG, in the toilets and the dishwashing area in Building 2” at least two months before the deadly explosion. He later said other employees had also mentioned the smell to him. He testified that he verbally informed the owner of the biscuit factory and, together with the production manager, they went to the toilets to identify the source of the gas-like smell, “but we were unable to locate anything.” He added that a person involved with gas installations was later informed and visited the factory around mid-December to take measurements. “On that day, nothing was detected in the toilets. In the production areas we checked together, no LPG was detected either.”

Asked what he told staff about the smell that persisted, he said: “The production manager told me to say the smell was coming from the septic tanks until we saw what was going on.” He also testified about gas pressure loss in the ovens, “which was significant over the last month and a half. It was not my responsibility to check or fix it.”

H.P. further said that when he had no plumbing work to do, he helped other workers, mainly with carrying tasks. He added that “eight years ago I was assigned by Konstantinos Tziortziotis to install a new propane gas line to support the cereal production line. Mr. Tziortziotis gave me the plans to carry out the installation, which I did, even though he knew I did not have a propane gas installer’s license.” He clarified that he does not know who prepared the plans that were given to him by the owner.

“I covered my nose with my shirt so I wouldn’t inhale it. My supervisor told me not to be afraid—there would be no explosion”

A female employee’s testimony is dramatic. She said she reached the point of covering her nose with her shirt in order to breathe:

“I have worked at the company for about 10 years. I work in Building 2 at various positions along the production line. I was informed about the explosion by a relative over the phone. There was an odor in the area where I worked. From December 2025 onward—over the last two months—the smell became stronger as the days passed. In the production area, in some places such as behind the refrigerators where there were drainage-like structures, but especially in the toilets and the dishwashing area, there was a strong LPG smell.

“In the last week, I entered the toilets with my shirt covering my nose so I wouldn’t inhale it. Because I was very afraid an explosion might occur, I informed my supervisor. I told him about the presence of this LPG smell in the toilets and the risk of an explosion. He replied that I should not be afraid, that he was there for us.”

“They knew about the problem and didn’t do their job”

A relatively new employee testified: “I worked in Wing B, where the incident occurred, on the biscuit production line. I noticed a smell about four months earlier and identified it in the toilet area. I identify the smell as LPG, not sewage. According to what colleagues told me, they had informed Ms. N. (I don’t remember her surname), and I relied on that, but no work was done afterward because the smell continued. There were technicians who knew about the problem and did not do their job properly, resulting in the problem worsening and the explosion occurring.”

“Our eyes were burning”

Another employee described a similarly intense odor that made her eyes sting. She said she informed her supervisors:

“I have worked at the factory since 2002, in the building where the fire occurred. On the day of the explosion, I was not working. In the last 15 days before the fire, I noticed a strange smell in the toilets of Building 2. Along with the smell, my eyes were burning. It didn’t resemble a septic smell, nor was it a clean LPG smell. I informed the shift supervisor. She had noticed it too and said she had informed those responsible. The rest of my shift staff had also noticed it. I was concerned it might be LPG. I conveyed this concern to the shift supervisor, who told me she had informed management and they said it was something in the septic tanks and they would treat them.”

“It smelled like an LPG camping stove”

Another employee said she noticed the smell once on Saturday, 24/1/2026, and at least once more in the last two weeks. “I noticed it in the toilets of Building B and it resembled the smell of an LPG camping stove. On Saturday I didn’t inform anyone. The previous time, however, I informed one of the two shift supervisors.”

Other testimonies essentially describe the same thing: the presence of the smell and the fact that supervisors were informed.

“I had not noticed any odor,” claimed the production supervisor

S.M., the production supervisor at the Violanta factory, gave testimony to the Fire Service 36 hours after the accident. He was asleep at home when the deadly explosion occurred in the early hours of Sunday to Monday. Asked whether any employee had reported a propane/LPG odor to him, he replied: “No, never,” adding that he moved constantly throughout the factory and would have noticed it if there had been a smell, and that he “would have informed the technicians.”

Asked what the underground storage beneath Building B contained—where five female workers lost their lives—his answer revealed striking ignorance: “It may have contained useless packaging materials, leftover steel beams, sheet metal… The storage was not accessible to everyone.”

The expert

The mechanical engineer called by Violanta’s plumber to conduct a tightness test of the underground steel propane network detected, using specialized instruments, a significant gas leak in the above-ground network. He assessed that a leak had pre-existed in the underground network. The oven burners operated on propane from tanks.

By order of the Fire Service, measurements began on the underground pipelines as well. Notably, before even reaching the pipeline, at a depth of 60 centimeters, the detector measured a propane leak of 2,500 ppm instead of 0, which would be normal if there were no leak. In the basement, he measured 6,000 ppm. The engineer explained that this was due to a long-term leak in the underground pipe; once it reached the point of explosiveness, likely triggered by a spark, it caused the explosion with a very strong blast wave.

His testimony is among the most significant—and alarming—revealing that the fatal accident at Violanta was only a matter of time.

The outbreak of disaster

B.M., under 30 years old, was present as an eyewitness and survivor. He tried to save colleagues. His account is harrowing:

“I have worked at this factory for about 14 months. On 25/01/2026, I arrived at work at 22:30 to take over my shift until the explosion. I deliberately didn’t take a break to prepare for the morning shift. While I was at the dough-mixing area and had exited its entrance, I briefly spoke with a colleague about the doughs. The distance between us was about 10 meters, with no physical barrier. When the conversation ended, at that exact moment the lights went out and a loud noise was heard, which I compare to a hand grenade explosion, and I saw various objects being hurled (panels, sheet metal, parts of ovens, etc.).

“From where I was, I saw an open door ahead of me and immediately went outside from the rear side where the propane tanks are. I called the police at about 04:01. At the same time, I heard cries for help from inside the facility and heard the night-shift production supervisor calling everyone to get out. I re-entered through the same point with the colleague I had spoken to earlier, but we couldn’t do anything because sheet metal and the roof were collapsing and the fire had spread throughout the building, so we exited again.

“I then moved around the back toward the physical rehabilitation center and remember stepping over debris caused by the explosion. I went to the front parking area where I found the rest of the employees. I entered the raw materials storage in the adjacent building to try to return to the burning building to help the women from my shift—my friends—because I hadn’t seen them yet. Inside the storage, I encountered X., L.M., and G.S., embracing and covered in blood. We went to a door leading to a staircase, but it was blocked with debris, so we moved toward the truck loading bays. The first door wouldn’t open; the second did, and we all ended up in the parking lot. We then waited for the authorities to arrive. The building was almost completely on fire.”